(Source: "Beijing Evening News" and "Beijing News" 2026-01-27)

This year’s work report of the Beijing Municipal Government proposed to fully stimulate the vitality of various business entities, conduct regular reviews of fair competition in policies and measures, and comprehensively rectify involutional competition.

In the Central Economic Work Conference held at the end of last year, “deeply rectifying involutional competition” was listed as a key annual task. From "prevention" proposed in 2024 to "in-depth rectification", how to break the vicious cycle of "price war" and build a benign ecology that stimulates innovation has become the focus of attention from all walks of life. During the Two Sessions in Beijing, a reporter from the Beijing News exclusively interviewed Huang Yong, a deputy to the Municipal People’s Congress, a member of the expert advisory group of the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Committee of the State Council, and director of the Competition Law Center of the w88 casino, to provide an in-depth analysis of the policy implications, governance effectiveness and future paths.

Huang Yong, deputy to the Municipal People’s Congress, member of the expert advisory group of the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Committee of the State Council, and director of the Competition Law Center of the w88 casino. Photo by Beijing News reporter Wang Fei

Remediating "involution" is a long-term strategy to promote high-quality development

Beijing News:In 2025, "comprehensive rectification of involution competition" was written into the government work report for the first time. The Central Economic Work Conference at the end of last year further proposed "in-depth rectification." From "prevention" to "comprehensive rectification" to "in-depth rectification", what kind of deepening of governance ideas is reflected behind these changes in expressions?

Huang Yong:This change is essentially a systematic upgrade of the governance concept. From early "prevention", which is a relatively passive and defensive posture; to "comprehensive rectification", it means that we realize that "involution" is not a problem of a single enterprise, but a complex phenomenon involving multiple factors such as macro environment, industrial stage, local behavior, etc., which requires a systematic combination of policy tools to deal with; to "deep rectification", it conveys the long-term nature, institutionalization and determination of this work.

It requires that governance cannot stop at superficial corrections, but must directly address the institutional roots behind it. By improving the rule of law and strengthening rigid review, we must build a healthy competitive ecology that can self-correct and continue to be healthy. This clearly sends a signal to the market: rectifying "involution" is not a temporary measure, but a long-term strategy to promote high-quality development.

Beijing News:What significant results has this strategic deployment achieved over the past year?

Huang Yong:The results can be seen in several key indicators and phenomena.

First, in some key industries, such as photovoltaics, new energy vehicles and other fields, the national capacity utilization rate has begun to recover steadily. Behind this is the comprehensive effect of macro policy guidance, industrial planning optimization and strict implementation of standards, which curbs blind investment and low-level duplication of construction, and alleviates the pressure of vicious price wars caused by overcapacity from the source.

Second, the industry’s pricing and promotion behaviors are becoming more rational. The market regulatory authorities have effectively regulated the endless "subsidy war" and sales below cost through the release of typical cases, administrative interviews, and penetrating supervision. The order of market competition is being restored.

Third, and fundamentally, a multi-law collaborative governance mechanism involving the government, industry associations, platforms, and consumers, as well as a "multi-law co-governance" framework with anti-monopoly law, anti-unfair competition law, price law, and "Fair Competition Review Regulations" as the core have become increasingly clear and effective. This marks our shift from reliance on single law enforcement to a new stage of three-dimensional and systematic governance.

Fair competition review directly curbs the impulse to "fight for policies" in various places

Beijing News:You mentioned "comprehensive rectification", and the fair competition review system is considered to be the key to prevention at the source. During the "14th Five-Year Plan" period, this system has reviewed nearly 2 million policies and cleared about 100,000 policies. What specific fundamental role does it play in preventing "involution"?

Huang Yong:Its core role is to regulate government behavior from the source and cut off the chain of administrative power's improper intervention in the market and causing distortions. A deep driving force of "involution" is that some local governments, under the performance view of "economic growth first", engage in vicious investment competition and create "policy depressions" through excessive subsidies, tax refunds, low-priced land, etc., resulting in serious homogeneity of industrial layout.

The fair competition review system draws a "red line" for such policies. It requires that the impact on market competition must be assessed before policies are introduced, and selective subsidies must not be given to specific operators without a legal basis. This directly curbs the impulse of "fighting for policies" in various places, guides local governments to shift the focus of competition to long-term value such as optimizing the business environment and improving public services, and avoids overcapacity and subsequent "involution" caused by policy-driven policies.

Beijing News:In order for this system to "grow teeth" and achieve normalized rigid constraints, what do you think is the biggest implementation difficulty currently faced? Is it a matter of seeking blame or a lack of ability at the grassroots level?

Huang Yong:This is a systemic problem with several difficulties intertwined.

First of all, the review ability and professionalism are insufficient. The volume of government documents is huge, and reviewers with professional backgrounds in antitrust economics and law are extremely scarce. Many reviews remain at a formal level, making it difficult to make scientific judgments on the competing impacts of policies.

The second is the inherent limitation of the "self-censorship" model. Policymakers review themselves. It is difficult to guarantee independence and objectivity, and it can easily become a mere formality.

Thirdly, it is a deep-seated conflict over the orientation of political performance assessment. When the goal of promoting short-term economic growth conflicts with the principle of fair competition, local governments have strong incentives to avoid scrutiny.

Finally, it is difficult to implement the accountability mechanism. Although the newly revised regulations stipulate that those responsible for causing serious adverse effects shall be punished, there is a lack of clear standards on how to define "serious adverse effects", who shall identify them, and how to connect them with existing government sanctions regulations, resulting in the deterrent effect of the provisions being greatly reduced in practice. It can be said that the lack of ability is the "appearance" and the obstacles in the system and mechanism are the "inside".

To break the platform economic supervision, we should start with “force” and clarify the legal relationship

Beijing News:The platform economy is a prominent area of the "involution" phenomenon. However, its multi-sided market, cross-subsidization, algorithm black box and other characteristics make the identification of behaviors such as "below cost price" very complicated. How can normalized scrutiny effectively penetrate these complex business models?

Huang Yong:This is indeed a huge test of regulatory wisdom. The cost structure of the platform economy is complex, and traditional cost accounting methods are difficult to apply; the "black box" characteristics of the algorithm also make real-time monitoring and evidence collection difficult.

A key idea in the current regulatory breakdown is to shift from focusing on “costs” that are difficult to accurately calculate to focusing on more easily identifiable “coercive” behaviors. The new version of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law stipulates that platforms shall not force or covertly force merchants to sell at lower than cost prices. This means that the core of law enforcement is to examine whether the platform takes advantage of its dominant position to deprive merchants of their independent pricing rights through agreements, rules or algorithms.

Another penetrating analysis perspective is to examine whether the platform unreasonably passes on the operating costs it should bear to merchants. For example, through high commissions, harshness indicators, etc., the profits of merchants are squeezed, forcing them to engage in low-price competition in order to survive. Supervision needs to analyze the commercial rationality and fairness of this cost transfer. This requires supervision to have stronger technical capabilities and be able to conduct algorithm audits and data penetration analysis, "using technology against technology."

Beijing News:In emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and digital economy that need to encourage innovation, how to balance industrial policy and competition policy to avoid stifling innovation due to "excessive regulation" or creating new "involution" due to "disorderly subsidies"?

Huang Yong:The core here is to clarify the boundaries of government support and leave the direction and inspection of innovation to the market.

First of all, we must be wary of industrial policies turning into “subsidy competition”. When local governments use financial subsidies as the main means to attract enterprises, it can easily lead to irrational investment and resource misallocation, distort the innovation incentives of enterprises, and make them busy with "policy arbitrage" instead of technology research and development.

Therefore, the role of the government should be positioned as "guide" and "server". Financial support should be as inclusive and functional as possible rather than "picking winners." For example, Beijing issues "computing power coupons", and companies can choose how to use them based on market demand. This is a relatively market-oriented support method.

At the same time, supervision must remain prudent and inclusive, leave room for trial and error for innovation, and adopt more "principle supervision" rather than premature "rule supervision." However, tolerance does not mean laissez-faire. A dynamic evaluation mechanism must be established. Once signs of new "involution" caused by policies are discovered, corrections must be made in a timely manner.

Guiding enterprises to shift from "volume price" to "volume value" and innovation

Beijing News:You once proposed that solving "involution" requires the coordination of the three mechanisms of legislation, law enforcement, and justice. Looking forward to the "15th Five-Year Plan", in order to realize the leap from "strengthening the basic status" of competition policy to "dominating" other economic policies, what is the single system construction that needs the most breakthrough?

Huang Yong:The most core thing that needs breakthroughs is to further develop and improve the implementation efficiency of the antitrust law.

As the “economic constitution”, the antitrust law’s effective implementation is the cornerstone for competition policy to “rule” other policies. On the one hand, only by truly establishing the basic status of competition policy can we clear macro policy obstacles for the implementation of anti-monopoly law; on the other hand, anti-monopoly law can in turn consolidate the authority of competition policy by severely cracking down on monopolistic behavior and purifying the market environment.

During the "15th Five-Year Plan" period, the key is to form a coordinated closed loop of "scientific legislation, strict law enforcement, fair justice, and law-abiding by all people."

In terms of legislation, it is necessary to draw "red lines" and "safe zones" for innovation; in terms of law enforcement, it is necessary to break down departmental barriers, establish information sharing and law enforcement coordination mechanisms, and compress the space for "regulatory arbitrage"; in terms of judiciary, it is necessary to strengthen professional trial power, clarify rules through precedents, increase damage compensation, and increase the cost of violating the law. Only through the coordinated efforts of these three can competition policy be truly "hardened".

Beijing News:In your opinion, what are the core characteristics of an ideal competitive ecosystem that can stimulate native innovation? How should the three major entities of government, platforms, and enterprises perform their respective duties to jointly shape it?

Huang Yong:The ultimate goal of comprehensively rectifying "involutionary" competition is to guide enterprises to shift from "volume-price" to "volume-value" and innovation. The core feature of an ideal ecology is to give full play to the decisive role of the market in resource allocation, while at the same time aligning with internationally accepted rules with high standards.

This means that production factors can flow freely, and the success of enterprises depends on whether they can create greater value for consumers, rather than relying on policy protection or zero-sum games. At the same time, integrating domestic rules with international standards can force companies to improve their competitiveness and reduce the institutional costs of participating in the global market.

In this ecology, the boundaries between the three major entities should be clear.

The role of the government is to be a "night watchman" and a "server". Its core responsibility is to formulate rules to maintain fair competition, provide public services such as basic research, talent training, and open data, and make necessary investments in basic research. A high degree of caution should be exercised in directly subsidizing specific enterprises or technical routes to avoid creating distortions.

Platforms should abide by their duties as "intermediaries" and "rule enforcers" and must not abuse their market position to force merchants, or unreasonably pass on their own competition costs. It is necessary to establish open and fair platform rules to promote healthy competition among merchants on the platform.

Enterprises should become "value creators" and "innovation subjects", shift the focus of competition from price war to technological innovation, management optimization, brand building and user experience improvement, and win the market through true core competitiveness while complying with the rules.

Only with clear positioning and positive interaction among the three parties can they jointly create a healthy market ecology that is far away from "involution" and thrives on innovation.

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