Through the dispute over Vanke’s equity and CSGAReviewing important events such as the collective resignation of senior executives, Zheng Zhigang interpreted the phenomenon of listed companies' risk capital raising and "barbarian" invasion.Multiple shareholders with close shareholding ratiosExist and become at the same timeThe distinctive characteristics of Vanke’s equity structure, this merger incident quickly plunged the dispute over Vanke’s equity into a debate—should we follow the equity supremacy logic of the capital market, or should we fully incentivize entrepreneurial entrepreneurs’ human capital investment? AndCSGAExecutive collective resignation incidentEqually iconic, it is consideredYesA new upsurge in corporate governance events in the era of dispersed ownership.

So as China’s capital market enters the era of dispersed equity, how to prevent the invasion of “barbarians”? How to protect the entrepreneurial team’s human capital investment characterized by business model innovation? Zheng Zhigang shared Ali andSnap chatInspiration on the innovation of control arrangement model. Zheng Zhigang believes that the one-share-one-vote system represented by Alibaba, the dual-class share structure represented by JD.com, and theSnap chatThe triple shareholding structure as an example has its own advantages and disadvantages in terms of the degree of separation of cash flow rights and control rights, the intensity of signal transmission for business model prospects, the degree of professional division of risk sharing and business model innovation, risk sharing, and the status dependence of the exit mechanism and control rights. Therefore, a conversion and exit mechanism between different types of shareholders should be established to achieve state dependence of control arrangements.

In addition to various insurance funds, in recent years, there have been many various capital predators hiding behind complex pyramid structures in our country. This holding structure has brought about a series of problems such as the increased speculative psychology of small shareholders, the actual controller's enthusiasm for market speculation, and the breeding of corruption. It is also a bottleneck in the inheritance of family business wealth. In view of this, Zheng Zhigang cited the example of the Rockefeller family and elaborated on the positive role of trust funds in eliminating pyramidal holding structures and its reference significance for Chinese enterprises.

In his summary of how to choose a corporate governance model in the era of dispersed stock groups, he presupposed a beautiful blueprint for my country's capital market. First of all, the entrepreneurial team should hold multiple votes per shareBShare to focus on business innovation and long-term human capital investment; holdAOrdinary investors in 15018_15134|like stocks have less speculative motivations and turn to value investments because there are few complex pyramid structures; investors holding preferred stocks without voting rights focus on maintaining and increasing value due to the lack of incentives from market speculation; without the cover of the "pyramid", the money-power collusion of corrupt officials is therefore unsustainable, and a healthy and healthy capital market is formed.

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